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132 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
THE LEGAL TENDER CASES-A DRAMA OF AMERI-
CAN LEGAL AND FINANCIAL HISTORY. 
THE facts giving rise to the Legal Tender Cases 1 lead back 
to one of the darkest periods of the Civil War, from the 
standpoint of the North, and to a type of problem which is now 
absent from the national life. 
On February 25, 1862, the date of the passage of the first 
Legal Tender Act, 2 the financial situation of the government 
was desperate. Armies were in the field, and the duration of the 
war and the extent of its expense had already greatly exceeded 
the estimates made at the beginning of the conflict. The· Treas-
ury was empty, and the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. 
Chase of Ohio, was confronted with the necessity of raising 
funds without delay by the use of some new expedient. Com-
mencing about two months earlier,3 the banks throughout the 
country and the government had been compelled to suspend 
specie payments; that is,- they could no longer pay in gold those 
demanding such payments in exchange for government bills 4 or 
state bank bills which had ·been in general circulation as money. 
The suspension of specie payments was a very serious mat-
ter. The position of both the gov~rnment and the banks in 
dealing with the public was seriously impaired. Public confi-
dence in the government was lessened, and strength was lent to 
that section of public opinion which already felt that it was 
not going to be worth "the cost o£ the .struggle to conquer the 
South. 
1 Legal Tender Case (Juillard v. Green,man), 110 U. S. 421 (1884); Le-
gal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), 79 U. S. 457 (1871); 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1870). 
• Act Feb. 25, 1862, c. 33, 12 Stat. 345. 
• The exact date was December 30, 1861. DswtY, FINANCIAL HisTORY oJ! 
THS UNitt!> STATSs (lOth ed. 1924) 281. 
4 The government had therefore issued demand notes under the Act Dec. 
17, 1860, c. 1, 12 Stat. 121, of which $33,460,000 were then in circulation. 
Dswsv, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281. 
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In addition to this, the government was unable to secure fur-
ther funds from the banks on its demand notes, or in exchange 
for -bonds even at an interest rate of 7.3 per cent. , The im-
mediate needs of the war were so great, the government being 
$60,000,000 i~ arrears on the one item of the meagre pay of 
the soldiers and sailors, 5 and the expenses of the government 
being $2,000,000 per day, 6 that there was no time left to con-
duct a general campaign to sell •bonds to the public. Taxation 
was too slow a process to afford any relief. Taxes should have 
been levied on an extensive scale earlier in the struggle, but no 
one had realized what was ahead. 
There were only two ways to secure at once the necessary 
funds. One was to issue bonds. and sell them upon the market 
for whatever they would bring, and the other was to print more 
paper money and use it to pay the government's bills. If .bonds 
were issued they could only be sold at ruinous discounts, and 
such a display of weakness on the part of the government would 
tend to further impair the confidence of the people, without 
which a successful prosecution of. the war seemed impossible. 
This, and the rapid increase in the public debt through bonds, 
would cause many others to feel that the conflict should be 
abandoned. Opinion was sharply divided, •both among pub-
lic· men and in financial circles, ·but it was decided that bonds 
should not ·be issued. As soon as paper money was turned to, 
the question arose as to whether it should be made legal tender 
for private purposes, that is, as to whether creditors should be 
compelled by law to accept the new paper at its face value in 
the payment of private obligations. 
From the adoption of the Constitution to the recent suspen-
sion of specie payments, it had always been possible to exchange 
government bills upon demand for gold. It was foreseen 7 that· 
any extensive issuance •by the government of paper money not 
redeemable in gold would result in a rapid depreciation of its 
value. This would be reflected in an increasing premium upon 
• 4 RHODES, HISTORY OJ! TH~ UNittn STATES (1906) 242 . 
• 3 ibid. 562. 
T D~WSY, op. cit. s11pra note 3, at 287. 
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gold. The suspension of specie payments had already caused 
gold to be worth upon the market stightly more than its nominal 
equivalent in paper money. 8 
Paper money had not before been made legal tender in pay-
ment of private obligations. If this status were to be given the 
paper now to be issued, the effect upon the relations of private 
parties throughout the country ·was easy to foresee. Debts which 
had been contracted upon the pre-existing gold basis would now 
be paid with depreciated paper money. In all future dealings 
the nature of the legal tender could ·be taken into consideration, 
and prices fixed accordingly, but as to debts already contracted 
the effect would ·be inescapable. A depreciation of ten per cent. 
in the value of the legal tender would mean a transfer of ten 
per cent. of all the debts in the -country from creditors to debtors. 
The government as the largest debtor in the country would be 
the -chief beneficiary of the process. Proponents and adversaries 
of the legal tender feature agreed that this would ·be a most un-
fortunate and unjust result. 
However, against all objections of every kind stood the ab-
solute necessity that the government have money at once to use 
fcir all purposes of the war. It was felt necessary to make the 
new money legal tender in payment of preexisting debts so that 
those receiving it from the government could discharge their ob-
ligations with it. Many of the soldiers' families had .been com-
pelled to contract debts because of the delay in paying the sol-
diers, and they needed money with which those obligations could 
be satisfied. Also, i£ creditors of the government were to be paid 
in money which they could not use in discharge of their own 
obligations they would ·be seriously discriminated against. It 
was true that without making the new money legal tender these 
results could be avoided if the government would give all per-
·sons with whom it dealt an additional amount, but the necessity 
of maintaining public confidence made this impossible. 
The advocates of the legal tender feature were also influenced 
by ideas of national sovereignty. Banks were attacked, and it 
was argued that the government should make itself independent 
• DEWEY, op. ·cit. supra note 3, at 293. 
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of hanks and Wall Street hy making its paper legal tender for 
all purposes. 9 
Secreta_ry Chase held hack from the drastic step of issuing 
such legal tender,10 and worked out a plan with representatives 
of ·leading banks whereby it could be avoided. After the bank-
ing representatives had returned to their various cities, however, 
one wired back that his principals would not agree to the plan, 
and rather than inflict a hardship upon those hanks which would 
cooperate with the government it was abandoned. 11 Secretary 
Chase, in reply to a direct request from the Committee on Ways 
and Means of the House of Representatives, finally stated that 
in his opinion legal tender notes had become necessary, and there-
after he energetically urged their issuance. Both public men 
and financiers were unable to agree whether the government 
could successfully pass through the emergency without legal 
tender notes,12 lbut after the most careful consideration 13 the 
decision was made in favor of issuance, and on February 25, 
1862, the Act was .passed, providing for such notes in the amount 
of $150,000,000. A ·leading historian has termed this Act "one 
of the landmarks in the history of American finance." 14 
Once the course had been embarked upon, there was no turn-
ing ·back. Large additional issues of legal tender notes were 
necessary in 1862 and 1863.15 The greatest total amount out-
standing at any time was $433,160,569, in 1865.16 
• D:ewsY, ~- cit. supra note 3, at 285. 
"' HART, Lm oF SAr.MoN PoRTI.AND CHASE (1899) 247, 249. 
n 3 RHODES, ~- cit. supra note 5, at 563. 
12 The following authorities approve the issuan.ce of the legal tender notes: 
BOGART, EcoNOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1913) 386; CAsE. 
CoNSTITUTIONAl. HISTORY oF THE UNITED STATES (1904) 247; SPAUI.DING, 
HISTORY OF THE LEGAr. TEND:ER P APE& MoNEY IssuED DuRING THE GREAT 
ReB:er.uoN (1869) 210. The following disapprove: HART, op. cit. s11pra note 
10, at 411; McCur.r.ocH, MEN AND MEAsUR:Es OF HAI.F A CENTURY (1888) 
175. Baron von Hock, the Austrian financier, in "Die Finanzen und die 
Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten" (Stuttgart, 1867), said that the 
issue of paper mon.ey is conceded to be jutifiable when a state is involved in 
a struggle for its own existence, after all resources of taxation and credit 
have been exhausted, although it is the most expensive and detrimental of 
all mearts of raising reven.ue. See 3 RHon:Es, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 471. 
12 CAsE, op. cit. s11pra note 12, at 245. 
11 DEWEY, op. cit. s11pra note 3, at 284. 
15 4 RHODES, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 237; SPAUI.DING, op. cit. s11pra note 
12, at 154, 187; DEWEY, op. cit. s11Pra note 3, at 288. 
11 SEN. REP. No. 275, 42d Cong. 3d Sess., Ser. No. 1548, at 1; SHERMAN, 
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As expected, the legal tender notes depreciated in value as 
compared with gold. The maximum depreciation was on July 
11, 186-t-, when one dollar in gold was worth $2.850 in legal 
tender.H On July 1, 1865, at the close of active hostilities, a 
dollar in gold was worth $1.41,18 and on February 7, 1870, the 
date of the first legal tender decision, $1.21.19 For a time the 
notes were somewhat supported by an option to convert into 
government bonds, the principal and interest of which were pay-
able only in gold specie, -but this was terminated in 1863.20 In 
order that depreciation of the notes might not lessen the revenue 
from the duty on imports, the notes were never made receivable 
for customs dues, and this increased the depreciation.21 
It is now known that during any extensive war, inflation·must 
follow the rapid expansion of. the amount of available credit 
through government war loans. At that time, however, the quan-
tity theory of money-that the value of the currency in ·terms of 
commodities depends upon the extent of the supply of all forms 
of money and credit-had not been developed. Consequently 
those who had opposed the issuance of the legal tenders attributed 
to them all th~ effects of the war-time inflation, although they 
were really only a contributing factor. 
The effect of the inflation from all causes was to produce great 
distress and hardship among certain classes of creditors, par-
ticularly widows and others dependant upon small fixed incomes. 
A historian says that "the government not only cheated its own 
creditors but enabled every debtor in the land to do lik~wise." 22 
There was a reduction of one-fifth to one-sixth in the real in-
StLlttTED SPttCH:ES AND RtPORTS ON FINANC!; AND TAXATION FROM 1859 TO 
1873 (1879) 381; DtwtY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 332. 4 RHoDtS, op. cit. 
supra note 5, at 428, gives the figure as $432,687,966. 
This was in addition to fractional currency and interest-bearing notes run-
ning for a brief period, both of which were also endowed with the legal ten-
der quality, but neither of which were important in their effect. Dtw:EY, op. 
cit. supra note 3, at 288, 310. 
17 PoMtROY, LIFt oF STEPH:EN ]. FitLD (1881) 66; DtwSY, op. cit. supra 
note 3, at 293; SPAULDING, op. cit. supra note 12, at 199. 
10 SPAULDING, op. cit. supra n.ote 12, at 212. 
,. HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 397; 6 RHoDts, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 265. 
"" Dt\V:EY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 290. 
21 DtwtY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 287. 
"' 6 RHoots, op. cit. supra note 5, at 264. 
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comes of wage earners, because of the slowness of adjustment 
of wages to the new currency level. 23 On the other hand, ac-
tive business men were correspondingly benefited. Many were 
enabled easily to pay off their debts, and thus felt encouraged -
to initiate new enterprises. 24 In addition to those who were 
actually amassing fortunes, others who were slow to realize that 
the value of a dollar had decreased felt that they were getting 
rich, and both classes were spurred on to greater activity.25 Of 
course all metals 26 had disappeared from circulation at the first 
threat of inflation of the currency, before the actual issuance of 
the first legal tender notes. Due to the dearth of coins, for a 
time "shinplasters," i. e., bills less than a dollar, issued by pri-
vate concerns, and stamps, were used for change, with resulting 
inconvenience. 27 Picture the citizen paying a bus driver his fare 
in stamps on a rainy, windy morning, or going shopping with 
a roll of. three cent stamps, which was the denomination most 
commonly used. This was later remedied by the issuance of 
fractional bills ·by the government. 
In the end the cost of the war was greatly increased by the 
use of the legal tenders. Dewey in his financial history says: 28 
"* · * * The total effect of paper issues in increasing the 
cost of the war has been estimated at between $528,000,000 
and $600,000,000; even this large amount is small when 
compared with the burdens which inflated prices placed upon 
the people in the ordinary relations of trade and industry." 
The fluctuating premium on gold caused a gold exchange to be 
opened in New York City. The usual exchange phenomena of 
speculation followed. 29 
Coincidentally with the inflation there occurred, in the fall of 
1862, a marked revival of business. From then until the end 
.. Mrrcm;z.L, A HISTORY oF 'l'H£ GR:e:eNBACKs (1903) 351, 395, 398. 
"' POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 66; 5 RHOD:€5, op. cit. supra note 5, 
at 202. 
z SPAULDING, op. cit. supra note 12, at 210. 
"" Nearly all the American coinage had been gold, although silver had ap-
peared in circulation as minor coin and in insignifican.t amounts in the form 
of dollars. D:ew:EY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 211, 403. 
"' 5 RHOD:€5, op. cit. supra note 5, at 191. 
"" D:EWF:Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 293. 
20 D:EW:EY, op. cit. snpra note 3, at 295-7. 
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of tlie war the Xorth was economically prosperous, without fur-
ther occasion for alam1 in regard to the financial condition of 
the gO\·ernment. The advocates of the issuance of the legal 
tender notes now overestimated their · importance, 30 and at-
tributed all the new prosperity to the use of. the legal tender 
device.31 
\Vith this background the stage was set for a very important 
decision by the United States Supreme Court in regard to the 
constitutionality of the legal tender provisions of the various 
acts, the decision being rendered February 7, 1870. By the 
time the question reached the Supreme Court in shape for de-
cision, Salmon P. Chase, who as Secretary of the Treasury had 
reluctantly and apparently against his own ·better judgment se-
cured the passage of the Legal Tender Ads, had become Chief 
Justice. It was perhaps an unparalleled situation in American 
jurisprudence, at least in connection with a matter of such uni-
versal importance, for a judicial officer to ·be charged with the 
responsibility of passing upon the validity of his own acts as 
an executive officer. 
As gold was still at a premium of twenty-one cents when the 
decision was rendered, a very important practical question was 
involved. The distress occasioned by the passage of the orig-
inal Legal Tender Act was now long past, and largely forgot-
ten, and if the legal tender provision was now to be held in-
valid another great upsetting of the relations of debtors and 
creditors would occur. This time the change would be in favor 
of. creditors at the expense of debtors, but the ones benefited 
now would rarely be those who suffered, when the original Act 
was passed. All the other effects necessarily attendant upon 
any sudden change in the standard of value would again fol-
low. This time wage earners and those having fixed incomes 
would benefit. 
The constitutional question was a very nice one. On the one 
hand, it was argued that the power given Congress in regard to 
the monetary system is "To coin Money, regulate the Value 
thereof, and of foreign Coin,"32' and that the term "coin" ap-
•• 5 Raonts, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 200. 
31 Hepburn v. Griswold, s11pra note 1, at 633. 
33 U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8. 
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plies only to metals. On the other hand, it was contended that 
the Constitution gives Congress power to "borrow Money on 
the credit of the United States" 33 and to regulate commerce, 
and that the power to issue legal tenders is necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the enumerated powers. Fundamen-
tally the contest represented a clashing of the Hamiltonian and 
Jeffersonian theories in regard to the national government .. 
Never before the Civil \V ar had there been a suggestion by 
any responsible -official of the Federal Government that there was 
any power to make anything other than gold and silver a legal 
tender in payment -of private obligations. 34 Webster in a speech 
in the Senate had expressed a belief that no such power existed. 35 
On the other hand, the question was not foreclosed by the lan-
guage of the' Constitution, and those who favored the legal ten-
ders claimed that the Union ~ould not have been preserved without 
their issuance. Making this assumption, they then contended that 
it was unthinkable that the Constitution prohibited the exercise 
of any power necessary t-o the preservation of the government. 
The situati-on when the case was abqut to be decided has been de-
scribed as follows :36 
"* * * The probable action of the Court had been the sub-
ject of long and excited debate in the ~ommunity. On the 
one side, were the National and State banks, the mort-
gagees and creditors who demanded payment in gold; lined 
up with these interests were those men who, on principle, 
denied the right -of the Federal Government to make paper 
currency legal tender, and opposed legalized cheating through 
the enforced payments of debts in depreciated ~urrency. 
On the other side; were the railroads, the municipal cor-
porations, the mortgagors of land and other debtors who 
now sought to pay, with a depreciated legal tender cur-
rency, debts contraded on a gold basis bef-ore the war; and 
with these interests, there were associated all those men 
who felt strongly that the Government ought not to be de-
prived -of a power which they considered so necessary to 
its existence in time of war. * * *" 
.. Ibid. 
"' HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 408 . 
.. Quoted in dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field, Legal Tender Cases 
(Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), supra note 1, at 659 . 
.. 3 WARREN, Tu:e SuPR:eM:e CouRT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1922) 221. 
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The cases were argued and reargued by numerous and dis-
tinguished counsel. lt is probable that never in the history of 
the Court has any question been more thoroughly considered 
before decision.37 
.:\t first sight it would seem that the public would expect the 
Court to lean toward upholding what the Chief Justice had 
done as Secre.tary of the Treasury, but other decisions touch-
ing fringes of the problem showed a leaning on the part of the 
Court against the legal tenders,38 ·and the rumor spread that 
such would be the decision. 39 In this instance the veil has been 
withdrawn from the proceedings of. the Justices in conference,40 
and it has been di~closed that when the case was taken up, on No-
vember 27, 1869, it was found, after a conference of several 
hours, in which all members of the Court participated, that the 
eight judges then on the Court were evenly divided.41 They 
. thereupon proceeded to the consideration of other cases, and in 
the c<>urse of the discussion of another case during the same 
conference Mr. Justice Robert C. Grier, then seventy-five years 
of age and unable to walk alone, made a statement inconsistent 
with his previous vote in fav<>r of the constitutionality of the 
legal tender provision. This led to further discussion of the 
question with him, and, after being reminded ·by another mem-
ber of the Court of what he had agreed to in a private conver-
sation, he changed his vote, and joined those who were against 
constitutionality. The Court then stood five t~ thre~ against 
constitutionality. Within a week all the other members of the 
Court united in advising Mr. Justice Grier that it was their 
"' Dissenting opinions in Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v. 
Davis), supra note 1, at 603, 634. 
"" DEWEY, op. cit. sttPra note 3, at 362. 
"" ScHUCKERS, LIFE AND PuBLIC SERVICES oF SALMON PoRTLAND CHASE 
(1874) 265. 
•• The disclosure was made in a paper prepared by Mr. Justice Miller and 
signed by the other members of the later majority at the time of. the second 
legal ten.der decision. The statem~nt was prepared in reply to one by Chief 
Justice Chase, which he had placed upon the files of the Court. When Chase 
learned that a reply would be made he withdrew his statement. Consequently, 
that of the majority was not filed. It was published in BRADLEY, MISCELLA-
NEous WRITINGS (1902) 71-4, and in (1902) 5 LAw NoTEs 229. 
n BRADLEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 54, 71, 73; PoMEROY, op. cit. supra 
not~ 17, at 75; 6 RHoDES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 262. 
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opinion that his physical condition was such that he ought to 
resign. He submitted his resignation, to take effect February 
1, 1870, and retired from the Court on that date, dying the 
following September 26th. 
It was <:ontemplated that the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold, 
the legal tender case, would be handed down January 31st, in 
which event Grier would have participated in it. It was, how-
ever, postponed one week, at the request of the minority, in order 
to enable dissenting opinions to be prepared, and <:onsequently 
was not rendered until February 7, 1870, six days after Grier's 
resignation had taken effect. Thus the decision was technically 
participated in only by seven Justices, divided four against three, 
in a Court legally composed of nine. 
As the <:onstitutional question was a novel one neither side 
was able to make a convincing argument based upon precedents, 
and neither was able to make a clear showing upon the words of 
the Constitution. Chief Justice Chase, for the majority, em-
phasized the fact that the Federal Government was one of limited 
powers, while Mr. Justice Miller, for the minority, stressed the 
absolute necessity for the existence of the legal tender power, 
stating that without its exerdse the government would have 
perished, "and, with it, the Constitution which we are now called 
upon to construe with such nice and critical a<:curacy." 42 
Dramatic events followed fast upon announcement of the de-
cision. An act had been passed on April 10, 1869,43 increasing 
the membership of the Court from eight to nine, to take effect 
the first Monday in December, 1869, and on February 7, 1870, 
the day the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold was announced, 
President Grant sent to the Senate the nominations of William 
Strong and Joseph P. Bradley as Associate J ustkes, one to fill 
the vacancy by Grier's resignation and the other to increase the 
number of Justices to nine.44 
The decision was popularly "regarded as an attack on sound 
Republican·doctrine made by five judges with Democratic affilia-
.. Dissenting opinion in, Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note-1, at 633 . 
.. Act. Apr. 10, 1869, c. 22, 16 Stat. 44. 
" E. R Hoar and Edwin M. Stanton had been nominated previously, but 
Hoar had been rejected by the Senate, and Stanton had died four days after 
confirmation. 
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tions while two Republican justices and one Independent had 
sturdily defended the faith." 4 ;; Hence, from the coincidence of 
dates, it was easy for a portion of the public to infer that as 
soon as President Grant had heard of the decision he had nomi-
nated two new Republican ] ustices to reverse it. It seems that 
as a matter of fact, the nominations were actually on the desk 
of the Senate, which met at the same hour as the Supreme Court, 
before the announcement by the Court of its decision.46 It is 
true that this does not necessarily disprove the charge, as the 
President could have receh·ed information as to what the de-
cision would be. However, even though the decision was re-
versed as expected, the accusation that President Grant "packed" 
the Court seems unfair. 
The men whom he nominated were Republicans of unques-
tioned standing and integrity. All the state courts that had passed 
upon the question, except Kentucky, had held in favor of constitu-
tionality, and such was the opinion of Republicans throughout the 
country. It is doubtful whether· the President could have found 
a Republican lawyer of standing who thought otherwise.47 It 
is believed that the verdict of history is against the charge.48 
Whether the newly appointed judges should have seen fit to dis-
regard the doctrine of stare decisis in regard to the decision just 
rendered is another question. 
Strong's appointment was confirmed by the Senate at once, 
and he became a member of the Court March 14, 1870. Brad-
ley's appointment was not confirmed until March 21st. ·He was 
sworn in on the 23rd, and took his seat on the 24th. On the 25th 
" 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 265. 
•• Paper by Charles Bradley, a son of Justice Bradley, in BRADLEY, op. 
cit. supra note 40, at 47-50. 
" 1 HoAR, AuTOBIOGRAPHY oF SEn:NTY YEARS (1'903) 287; 6 RHoDES, op. 
cit. supra note 5, at 270; 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 239. 
'" The following support the charge: THE FEDERALIST (Ford, 1898), In_-
troduction, xviii; McCuLLocH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 173; ScHUCKERS, 
op. cit. supra note 39, at Chap. 18, semble. The following reject the charge: 
1 HoAR, op. cit. supra note 47, at 286; HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 400; 
Hoar, The Appointment of Judges Strong and Bradley (1872) 14 THE NA-
TIOX 256; 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 270; 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra 
note 36, at 239; DEWEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364. The charge was made 
in a Liberal Republican platform. See (1872) 14 THE NATION 234. 
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the Attorney General moved to take up two cases which had 
been passed over that also involved the legal tender question, and 
on the following day the Court voted, five to four, to do this.49 
The majority was composed of the three justices who has dis-
sented in Hepburn v. Griswold and the two new appointees. 
With intense feeling between the Justices,50 the question was 
reconsidered, and on May 1, 1871, the decision in the so-called 
Legal Tender Cases 51 was announced, by the same five-to-four 
vote overruling Hepburn v. Griswold and holding the Legal 
Tender Acts constitutional. The announcement of the decision 
on that date was somewhat unusual, as on account of the illness 
-of the Chief Justice the opinions were not made public until 
January 15, 1872. The arguments pre.sented in the opinions 
were substantially the same as in the earlier decision. 
Was the majority justified in so quickly overruling Hepburn 
v. Griswold? The country had been put upon notice so soon 
after the earlier decision that the question would be reconsidered 
that the reversal did not have the effect that it otherwise would 
have had. In fact, even immediately after the announcement of 
the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold there was no reduction in 
the market premium on gold, showing that the public expected 
that the legal tenders would yet be held constitutional.52 
Technically the majority in Hepbum v. Griswold consisted 
-of only four Justices, in a Court legally composed of nine, the 
act increasing the number of Justices having taken effect the 
-first Monday of the preceding December. On the other hand, it 
was due to the request of the minority for time in which to pre-
pare dissenting opinions that the decision was not handed down 
until after the date of the taking effect of Grier's resignation. 
'The majority in the newly constituted Court no doubt felt some-
what justified in disregarding Grier's connection with the case 
• ScHucn:as, op. cit. supra note 39, at 261-5 . 
.. BRADL~Y, (Jjl. cit. snpra note 40, at 61 et seq.; HART, op. cit. s11pra n.ote 
10, at 403; 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 268; ScHucnRs, op. cit. supra 
note 39, at 265. 
11 Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), snpra note 1. 
12 HART, op. cit. snpra note 10, at 403. Contra: 3 WAR~N, op. cit. sllpra 
note 36, at 242. 
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because of his physical enfeeblement and the circumstances un-
der which his adherence to the decision had been secured. 
The chief objection to the reversal was the resultant loss of 
public confidence in the Court, which presisted for some years.53 
However, the contemporary prediction of "The Nation" that a 
reversal would set a precedent which would result in constant 
tampering with the number of the Supreme Court Justices by 
Congress has not been justified.:;-~. 
\Vhiie the reasoning in Hepburn v. Griswold was applicable 
to the entire constitutional question, only preexisting debts were 
actually involved in the facts of the case. The later Court could 
have preserved a technical adherence to the doctrine of stare 
decisis by iimiting Hepburn v. Griswold to that situation and 
holding the Acts valid as to all obligations thereafter contracted. 
In view of the nature of the Court's reasoning, this would not, 
however, have been a frank method of handling the situation. 
It also would have meant that Hepburn v. Griswold would still 
destroy the feasibility of the issuance of such legal tender in the 
future. 
In Juilliard v. Greemnmt,55 the last of the legal tender cases, 
decided in 1884, it was held that Congress could issue legal ten-
der notes in times of peace as well as war, the earlier cases hav-
ing passed only upon the war-time power. 
Did the framers of the Constitution intend that Congress 
should have the power to make other than gold and silver legal 
tender in the payment of private obligations? In an endeavor 
to answer this question the parties to the controversy assiduously 
searched the records of the Federal Convention and other early 
documents, but without conclusive results. The language of the 
Constitution leaves the question open, and the debates in the 
Convention do not reveal any consensus of opinion. The word 
·"coin" is used, as has already been pointed out, and the Conven-
tion rejected by a vote of nine states to two a resolution which 
"' 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 244. 
"' Editorial, The Reopening of the Legal Tender Case (1870) 10 Tat NA-
TION 218. 
•• Legal Ten.der Case (Juilliard v. Greenman), supra note 1. 
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would have added to the clause granting the power to borrow 
money the words "and emit bills." 56 
Those who framed the Constitution had experienced the evils 
of depreciated paper money. During the Revolutionary \Var 
the states had issued over $200,000,(X)() of paper notes, which 
had become totally worthless before the Convention assembled.57 
The Continental Congress had issued $241,552,780 of paper 
money, $119,400,000 of which had been redeemed at the rate of 
forty to one, the remainder, except $6,000,000, being eventually 
a total loss.58 One of the principal causes which led to the ex-
periment of creating a national government was the desire to 
prevent such abuses. There was "a loud and general outcry 
against the conduct of the people of Rhode Island, who had 
kept themselves aloof £rom the national convention, for the ex-
press purpose, among others, of retaining to themselves the 
power to issue such currency." 59 
Nevertheless the nature of the discussion in the Convention is 
such as to permit the inference that the delegates did not intend 
to definitely deprive Congress of the legal capacity to issue bills, 
preferring rather to trust to the strength of the new government 
as a protection against abuses. The debate was upon a proposi-
tion to grant the power expressly, and its rejection is consistent 
with an assumption that the delegates felt that the power other-
wise existed. 
Was the issuance of the legal tenders necessary for the pres-
ervation of the government during the Civil War? The answer 
to this depends entirely upon the state of popular sentiment in 
support of the·government at that time. This was only a matter 
of personal estimate then, and Ca.nnot now be accurately judged. 
While the issuance was being considered, "The London Eco-
nomist" seized upon the difficulties of, the situation to deliver an 
.. 2 Tnr; R:£coRDs oF '.I.'H£ Fsn:eRAL CoNVJ;NTION oF 1787 (Farrand, 1911) 
309 et seq.; 5 DSBAn:s oN '.I.'H£ AnoPTioN oF '.I.'H£ FsnSRAL CoNSTI'.I.'UTION (El-
liot, 1907) 434 et seq.; DSWSY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 67. 
"' Dr;wr;y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 36; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
Clifford, Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and :Parker v. Davis), supra note 
1, at 622 . 
.. Dr;wr;Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 36, 39, 41, 92; BOGAR'l', op. cit. supra note 
12, at 112 . 
.. 2 CURTIS, HrsTORY oF '.I.'H£ CoNS'.I.'ITuTroN (1858) 329. 
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editorial homily to the effect that Lincoln should arrange a set-
tlement of the war, in spite of popular clamor, pointing out that 
the Xorth's money. which was the strong element on its side at 
the outset, had been spent, or nearly all, and that the South was 
still unsubdued. In the same editorial the case for inflation 
was well put as follows : 60 
"\ \r e long ago nientioned, if not to prophesy, at least to con-
jecture, that which is now happening. We showed that the 
pecuniary cost of a great military effort, such as the North 
is now making-an effort which costs more than seven 
times as much as the ordinary revenue in past times, could 
not be rationally defrayed by taxation. The tax-gatherer 
arriYes at a limit to his exactions long before such vast sums 
can be realized. Credit is the natural resource of those who 
have it, but Federations at a .crisis of revolutionary disunion 
cannot hope to have credit abroad; and America is a poor 
country,-perhaps that is an unduly offensive expression-
a new country, in which profits are very high, and in which 
every sixpence is profitably invested. The rate of interest 
in Wall Street used always to be double the interest in Lom-
bard street. Such a country cannot lend its Government 
much, for it has no capital disengaged. The currency re-
mains the one fund from which a Government in the crisis 
of revolution, when all credit is at an end, can at once ob-
tain a large sum. * * * · 
"The general conclusion is the painful and lamentable one, 
that if l\1r. Chase will spend the money he talks of, he must 
issue paper to an extent which will frighten every one,-
which will depreciate ~ecurities,-which will derange trans-
actions,-which will take from the creditor,-which will 
give to the dehtor,-which will destroy what remains of 
the American credit in Europe. The only alternative is the 
cessation of the war." 
After the successful conclusion of an enterprise it is hard to 
appreciate the difficulties and dangers encountered by those en-
gaged in it. All that can now be said in regard to this particular 
situation is that those in charge of the financial destinies of the 
government found the situation desperate. They knew that the 
legal tender feature would r~nder assistance to the new govern-
.. Editorial, Tlze Suspensio1~ of Specie Pasments at New York (1862) 20 
LoNDON EcoNOMIST 57. 
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ment bills, and undoubtedly some help was secured from it. The 
government was saved. Whether it could have been preserved 
without this action can be only matter of conjecture. 
If a sufficient quantity of the legal tenders had been issued, there 
would have resulted an eventual collapse of the entire monetary 
system, as occurred in the case of European countries during the 
World War. An important element of assistance to the govern-
ment in avoiding this was the work of Jay Cooke in selling bonds 
directly to the .people. 61 Cooke, a Philadelphia banker, was ap-
pointed by Chase general agent of the government for that pur-
pose in 1863, and by January 21, 1864, he had sold $5,000,000 
of six per cent. bonds directly to the people at par. The people 
took the bonds at par as a matter of patr:iotism, and in 1864 the 
financial tide turned in favor of the government. 02 
Notwithstanding the power found to exist in Congress in Juil-
liard v. Greenman to lssue legal tenders in time of peace as well 
as war, it seems clear that conscious inflation of legal tender is 
indefensible except under the most desperate conditions threaten-
ing the existence of the government. It is an ethical question 
relating to war whether it can justifiably be done then. It may 
be argued that it is better for the creditor to lose a portion of his 
debts than to lose his country. It is interesting to note that the 
Confederacy did not resort to the device. 03 
The problem closed with the resumption of specie payments 
January 1, 1879. Two weeks before that date the legal tenders 
reached parity with gold. 64 While the government has since 
been threatened with inability to continue specie payments, a;; no 
other suspension has occurred. The legal tenders have never 
been retired, except in part, and $346,681,080 are still outstand-
ing.66 After the legal_tender decisions resolutions were offered 
in Congress in favor of proposed constitutional amendments to 
remove from Congress the power to make other than gold and 
n SPAULDING, op. cit. supra note 12, at 189. 
02 See table of depreciation in D~w~Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 293. 
"'~ RHon:es, op. cit. supra note 5, at 572. 
60 D~wsv, op. cit. supra note 3, at 375. 
05 D~w:ev, op. cit. supra note 3, at 447-450 . 
.. D:ew:ev, op. cit. supra note 3, at 341, 377; Monthly Bulletin of National 
City Bank of New York, Feb., 1929, at 29. 
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silver legal tender.67 Such action would not be in accord with 
present monetary theories: 
At the present moment of peace and prosperity the possibility 
that the government will again be confronted with financial diffi-
culties such as those encountered during the Civil War seems 
very remote. The country has now developed a· vastly stronger 
financial structure than it had in 1862. The Federal Reserve 
System was a tower of strength during the World War.6B A 
sufficiently desperate struggle for national existence might pro-
duce a similar financial emergency. 
Joseph M. Cormack. 
UNIVERSITY oF SouTHER~ CAUFORNIA, ScHOOL oF LAw. 
111 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 381. 
68 DEwEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 503. 
